lenge their exclusions from deb~tes on direct constitutional grounds. 6 But one candidate, the New Alliance Party's Lenora Fulani, has twice advanced a novel legal attack against the televised debate system's exclusion of minor party candidates. Under Federal Election Commission regulation I I0.13(a), only tax-exempt organizations may sponsor televised debates. 7 To receive tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, an organization must abstain from partisan political activity. 8 Fulani has argued that the Treasury Department's granting of tax-exempt status to the League of Women Voters and the CPD violates the statute because, by limiting debates to major party candidates, the organizations engage in impermissible partisan political activity. 9 If Fulani's challenge resulted in revocation of a sponsoring organization's tax exemption, Rule 110.13(a) would bar that organization from sponsoring debates.
The defendant Treasury Department and sponsoring organizations replied that Fulani lacked standing to challenge the organizations' tax status. 10 The Second Circuit recognized Fulani's standing to maintain the action, 11 while the District of Columbia Circuit denied standing. 12 The ultimate resolution of this issue will strongly influence the future of minor-party candidacies in the United States: judicial recognition of standing in this context could lead to eventual victory on the merits Staging organizations. (1) A non-profit organization which is exempt from federal taxation under 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3), and a nonprofit organization which is exempt from federal taxation under 26 U.S.C. 50l(c)(4) and which does not endorse, support or oppose political candidates or political parties may stage nonpartisan candidate debates in accordance with 11 CFR 110.13(b) and 114.4(e). 11 C.F.R. § 110.13(a) (1991).
8. Section 50l(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, the statute under which the government has granted both the League and the C.P.D. tax-exempt status, exempts from federal taxation, in relevant part:
(A)ny •.
• fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for ... charitable ..
• or educational purposes ••. , no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any •.
• individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda ... , and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing and distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (1988). 10. Standing doctrine involves a set of rules that determine whether a litigant may raise a particular issue in a particular court. Lack of standing effectively prevents a plaintiff from pursuing her claim.
11. See League, 882 F.2d at 628.
12. See Brady, 935 F.2d at 1331.
[Vol. 90:838 for a minor-party candidale. 13 The standing battle will also affect the future of standing jurisprudence as a whole: standing for candidates to mount tax challenges would boost other third-party challenges to regulatory decisions and affirm our legal system's capacity to confront coherently some of its deeply rooted inequities. This Note argues that courts should recognize minor-party presidential candidates' standing to challenge the section 50l(c)(3) tax-exempt status of organizations sponsoring televised debates that exclude minor-party candidates. Part I situates the issue within the context of the Supreme Court's standing jurisprudence and concludes that the validity of a third-party tax-status challenge by an aggrieved minorparty presidential candidate remains an open question. Part II analyzes the Second and District of Columbia Circuits' decisions and concludes that the Second Circuit's approach properly interprets the Supreme Court's standing doctrine and correctly resolves the particular arguments which both courts consider. Part III first demonstrates that the Supreme Court's standing doctrine permits an inquiry into the public interests which granting standing in this context may advance. It then examines political scientists' conclusions about minor parties in U.S. politics and argues that the inherent inequities of our political structure, the importance of media exposure in elections, and the social value of minor-party candidacies support granting standing for minor-party candidates. Part IV explores some of the questions which the U.S. political system will need to address if courts grant standing for minor-party candidates and the plaintiffs eventually win their challenges to debate sponsors' tax exemptions. This Note concludes that courts should grant standing for minor-party presidential candidates to challenge the tax-exempt status of organizations that exclude them from televised debates.
I. SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court has characterized standing as involving both constitutional and prudential considerations. 14 The Court has located three standing requirements in Article III of the Constitution: the plaintiff must have suffered a personal injury-in-fact; the injury must be fairly traceable to defendant's allegedly illegal conduct; and the plaintiff's requested relief must be likely to redress her alleged injury.15 Although the elements often overlap conceptually, 16 the Court typically analyzes them in succession. The Court also considers various "prudential" limitations on standing beyond the direct constitutional limitations. 17 This Part examines how the Supreme Court's doctrine affects a minor-party candidate's standing to challenge the tax-exempt status of a debate sponsor. Section I.A discusses the Court's injury-in-fact requirement, the dominant prong of the Court's three-pronged constitutional standing analysis. Section I.B examines the Court's decisions denying standing for lack of traceability and redressability, focusing on the major cases denying standing for third-party challenges to regulatory action. It concludes that the Court will not deny a plaintiff standing simply because she alleges an indirect harm. Section I.C briefly discusses the Court's prudential limitations on standing and concludes that they do not apply to third-party tax status challenges.
A. Injury in Fact
1. The Doctrine
The Supreme Court typically begins its standing analysis with the injury-in-fact requirement. 18 The requirement, initially articulated in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 19 ensures that a court will resolve legal issues "in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action." 20 The Court has noted that tying each ruling to all of the facts of each particular case reduces the precedential value of any one standing decision. 21 The Court's decisions nonetheless draw certain broad lines: a plaintiff's injury-in-fact need not be economically quantifiable, and many other people may share the injury. 22 Furthermore, the Court does not consider the magnitude of a plaintiff's alleged ininjury with a no-traceability analysis. Plaintiff residents of Rochester, New York contended that neighboring Penfield's zoning ordinances precluded construction of low-income housing. After finding that plaintiffs had not suffered cognizable injuries, the Court accepted plaintiffs' allegation that the ordinance had increased housing prices in Penfield for the purpose of separately discussing traceability. 422 U.S. at 504. But the Court never recognized, even arguendo, any harm stemming from this alleged effect; its traceability analysis therefore lacked an injury to trace, leading it to find no traceability. 422 U.S. at 506-07. The Court failed to explain convincingly why, after it had rejected standing for lack of injury, it needed to inquire into traceability. [Vol. 90:838 jury. 23 The critical consideration is whether the plaintiff actually suffered the alleged injury; if not, the Court's examination of her claim "becom[es] no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders" 24 and "an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable." 25 Examination of Supreme Court and circuit court decisions applying the injury-in-fact requirement demonstrate that a broad range of actual, personal injuries may satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. The Supreme Court has recognized intangible injuries to plaintiff's interest based upon environmental degradation. 26 In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), plaintiff environmentalists claimed injury from environmental degradation resulting from a federal commercial regulation. 27 The Court recognized plaintiffs' injuries, stressing that plaintiffs had alleged cognizable personal injuries to their individual use and enjoyment of natural resources. 28 The Court recognized similar but more acute injuries in Duke Power Co. ·v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. 29 Plaintiffs in that case, including residents living near a nuclear power plant, claimed several immediate harms from a regulation facilitating the plant's operation; the Court found these injuries sufficient to support standing. 30 In both of these cases, the Court recognized arguably remote, ideologically motivated injuries because plaintiffs demonstrated that the challenged actions affected them directly and personally.
Lower federal courts have followed the Supreme Court's tendency to recognize environmental injuries. An environmental group whose members used national wildlife refuges to observe wildlife alleged a sufficient injury to challenge opening of the refuges to hunting. 31 An- 27. 412 U.S. at 675-76 (Plaintiffs challenged the Interstate Commerce Commission's increase in rates for rail freight carriers on the ground that the increase would harm the environment by encouraging use of nonrecyclable products.).
28. 412 U.S. at 689. The Court distinguished Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (denying environmental group's standing to challenge federal approval of ski resort in natural forest), noting that plaintiffs in that case had alleged only a special interest in preserving the environment rather than personal injury from environmental damage. 412 U.S. at 685; see also Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Socy., 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4 (1986) (holding that adverse effect on plaintiff's watching and studying of whales was a sufficient injury·in·fact to support standing in suit to compel federal agency to take action under statute restricting whaling 32 An appellate court also found standing for consumer groups to raise challenges to federal automobile emissions standards on the theory that the standards impinged upon consumers' freedoms to purchase the types of cars they wanted. 33 As in the preceding cases, the court recognized harms in the two emissions cases because the plaintiffs were able to allege tangible, personal stakes in the legal issues involved.
Outside the environmental context, courts have been less willing to recognize injuries-in-fact in controversial cases. The Supreme Court denied an advocacy group standing to challenge a conveyance of land from the federal government to a religious college at a discounted price. 34 Plaintiffs claimed harm from violation of the constitutional separation of church and state; the Court found the injury insufficient because plaintiffs failed to plead any direct personal injury resulting from the alleged constitutional viohttion. 35 The Court hinted that some harm to plaintiffs' interests from the property transfer itself might have sufficed for standing purposes, 36 but the mere "observation of conduct with which one disagrees" 37 did not.
The Court similarly found no cognizable injury where plaintiffs alleged that a community's zoning ordinance hindered their ability to find affordable, low-income housing. 38 The Court concluded that plaintiffs were merely residents of the area which the ordinance affected, not intended residents of specific projects, and thus suffered no personal injuries. 39 These alleged injuries seem no more remote or ideologically rooted than those alleged by plaintiffs in SCRAP and Duke Power. The Court also offered no policy bases for distinguishing the two sets of cases, but the Court has hewed strictly to its injury-infact standard.
Commentators have sharply criticized the injury-in-fact standard as a foundation for standing jurisprudence, charging that its un- who can confidently assert a tangible, personal injury is likely to win standing even for a causally remote or ideologically motivated injury.
The Standard in Competitor Standing Cases
The "competitor standing" doctrine, which allows standing for a plaintiff involved in an enterprise who challenges a policy that illegally benefits her competitor(s), figured prominently in the Second and D.C. Circuits' analyses of Fulani's standing. This doctrine, developed in economic competition cases, allows plaintiffs to challenge government actions that place them at competitive disadvantage. Such a disadvantage clearly satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement: the Supreme Court in the Data Processing case articulated that requirement in a competitor standing context. 46 Plaintiffs in that case, providers of data processing services, proved that an allegedly unlawful Comptroller of Currency regulation expanding the range of services national banks could provide "might entail some future loss of profits" and that the banks had already prepared to provide services to some of plaintiffs' customers. 47 The Court held there was "no doubt" that plaintiffs had alleged an actual injury.4s
The Court continued to develop the competitor standing doctrine in financial service contexts. In a subsequent case, investment companies challenged a regulation that permitted banks to operate collective investment funds in alleged violation of a federal statute. The Court held that Data Processing "foreclosed" defendant's challenge to plaintiff's standing. 49 Although the facts of the two cases were similar, the plaintiffs, statutes, and services involved were distinct; the Court's wholesale grafting of the Data Processing holding onto the subsequent case suggests that the competitor standing doctrine carries considerable precedential force. The Court recently reaffirmed the doctrine when it recognized a financial service trade organization's standing to challenge a ruling of the Comptroller allowing a bank to offer discount brokerage services. 50 Aside from its distinct fact situation, the case differed from the Court's earlier competitor standing decisions in that the plaintiff challenged a specific agency ruling rather than a regula- (1984) (recognizing injury-in-fact where government action arguably diminished children's right to education in an integrated school but denying standing for lack of traceability). tion of general application.st The Court has not wavered from its approval of injury to competitive interests as a basis for standing.
The District of Columbia's federal courts have also applied the competitor standing doctrine, not only to redress similar economic injuries, s2 but also to protect political rights. In an early case, the D.C. District Court recognized the rights of voters, political workers, and campaign contributors to sue major-party campaign organizations for alleged violations of statutes limiting campaign contributions.s 3 Although plaintiffs sued their competitors, rather than challenging a government action as the plaintiffs in the Supreme Court's competitor standing cases had done, the district court acknowledged an injury analogous to competitive disadvantage: that "the votes of the plaintiffs and their efforts to effect the nomination or election of individuals of their choice are likely to be, as a practical matter, diluted or even nullified. "S 4
The D.C. Circuit subsequently permitted individuals and organizations to challenge election regulations and statutes affecting their political activities on even more clearly defined competitor standing theories. ss The court's analysis turned on recognition of alleged harms from competitive disadvantages to plaintiffs' "political voices -their influence in federal elections"S 6 through campaign contributionss7 and lobbying. ss In extending competitor standing into the political sphere, the D.C. courts worked no great innovation but simply recalled the Supreme Court's maxim that injury, for standing pur- The court suggested that plaintiff could have pleaded a sufficient harm by identifying patrons of the nonprofit organizations' travel enterprises "who might legitimately be expected to do business with a private travel agent in the event appellees enforced the relevant tax code provisions according to appellants' reco=endations." 566 F.2d at 148. Besides seeming to bear more on redressability than on injury-in-fact, this invitii.tion to hypothetical pleading undermines the court's attempt to distinguish between an actual injury and a mere effect on the competitive environment. Even so, the court's formulation does not measurably alter the competitor standing doctrine because it still permits plaintiffs to prove injury by pleading specific adverse effects from competitive disadvantage. [Vol. 90:838 tions that prove the doctrine. In none of them did a court mitigate either the Supreme Court's conception of the doctrine or its genesis in the D.C. Circuit. Rather, the courts rested their rejections squarely on deficiencies in the specificity of pleadings. Such deficiencies should defeat claims of injury-in-fact in any standing analysis. 67 These courts' rigorous applications of the doctrine, along with the numerous decisions recognizing injury-in-fact where plaintiffs have shown specific, personal injuries to competitive advantages, demonstrate that competitive injuries fully satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of the constitutional standing test.
In re
B. Traceability and Redressability
The Doctrine
Once a plaintiff has established an injury-in-fact, she must show both that her injury can reasonably be traced to the challenged conduct and that the court can redress the injury by granting the relief she seeks. 68 Courts employ the traceability and redressability requirements to weed out cases in which causal relationships between injuries and illegal acts are "too attenuated" or prospects for relief from a favorable disposition are "too speculative." 69 Thus, the plaintiffs in Warth v. Seldin 70 failed to show a sufficient causal link between their inability to secure low-income housing and defendant town's zoning ordinance. 71 Similarly, supporters of an unsuccessful presidential candidate failed to show that alleged illegal acts of his opponent, the incumbent president, limited their ability to induce support for their candidate. 72 In another case, advocates for the handicapped could not demonstrate that an FCC order permitting a radio station's owner to purchase the station had caused the station's allegedly unlawful disregard for rights of the handicapped. 73 Even so, plaintiffs need not anticipate and rebut every speculative, hypothetical infirmity which defendants might raise. 74 Duke Power, defendant nuclear plant operator unsuccessfully attacked traceability and redres-in following plaintiff's causal claim, successful showings of traceability and redressability rely on whether plaintiff defines his injuries in proportion to the illegal acts he charges. 75 The early development of the traceability and redressability standards suggests that they are aspects of the same test. 76 But the Supreme Court has explicitly distinguished the two standards as they apply to cases "in which the relief requested goes well beyond the violation of law alleged." 77 Differentiating between the two requirements, the Court stated: "To the extent there is a difference, it is that the former examines the causal connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged injury, whereas the latter examines the causal connection between the alleged injury and the judicial relief requested. "78 Because virtually all plaintiffs in cases involving standing issues sue for injunctive or declaratory relief against the illegal conduct charged, the redressability requirement becomes academic. 79 In any event, the D.C. Circuit has also equated traceability and redressability where the relief requested is cessation of the illegal conduct 80 or where the claimed injury will occur in the future as the result of an agency action. 81 Even courts that analyze traceability and redressability sepasability by contending that, had Congress never passed the challenged act facilitating private development of nuclear power, the government would have developed nuclear power on its own, causing the same injuries which plaintiffs claimed from the plant. 84 This approach would ensure consistent standing rulings in subsequent litigation. Commentators have also criticized the redressability requirement as demanding excessive certainty.ss Traceability and redressability appear to be settled features on the Supreme Court's standing landscape, but these criticisms, and the precedential inconsistencies that have prompted them, underscore the elusiveness of these requirements.
The Standards in Challenges to Federal Regulatory Status of Third Parties
The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff's injury-in-fact need not result directly from the defendant's allegedly illegal act. Rather, the injury may issue from a third party, not before the Court, whose harmful behavior the challenged act makes possible. 86 Such indirect causation may simply make plaintiff's showing of traceability -and, by extension, redressability -more difficult as a practical matter. 87 The issue of "third party causation" arises most frequently in cases v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), "that a person with a legal right to a particular remedy loses that right when she seeks to achieve something else indirectly by means of that remedy and when it is unlikely that the ultimate goal will be achieved"); Sunstein, supra note 75, at 1458 (pointing out that "[t]he consequences of greater enforcement for any particular member of the class of beneficiaries are often unavoidably speculative" in the context of regulatory status challenges). where plaintiffs assert harm caused by injuries from third parties' favorable status under federal regulations.
Courts have granted standing in challenges to a variety of regulations where third parties caused plaintiffs' injuries, inclucl4ig nearly all of the competitor standing cases. 88 Other plaintiffs have shown indirect harms sufficient to support standing by alleging that federal fuel efficiency standards diminished their consumer options, 89 and that federal orders or regulations degraded the environment, thereby diminishing plaintiffs' demonstrated personal enjoyment of the outdoors. 90 Although these cases required courts to accept at least two-staged causal relationships, some of them quite tenuous, 91 the courts obliged wherever they found logical connections between regulations and injurious acts.
Courts have repeatedly refused to grant standing in cases challenging third parties' tax exemptions. But the Supreme Court has never categorically prohibited such challenges. IQ.stead, the specific facts of the tax-status challenges have failed to support standing because plaintiffs have failed to prove either sufficient injuries-in-fact or traceability and redressability. Plaintiffs in Allen v. Wright failed to allege sufficient injuries-in-fact based on the "mere fact" of the government's failure to deny tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools. 92 Absence of sufficient injury-in-fact defeated an industry group's allegation of vague harm from the government's failure to tax nonprofit organizations' supposedly competitive income. 93 It also precluded, in Khalaf v. Regan, 94 challenges to the tax-exempt status of pro-Israel organizations by certain pro-Palestinian plaintiffs whose claimed harms amounted only to the undesirable observation of poll-88. See cies with which they disagreed. 95 Overly attenuated traceability and redressability arguments were fatal to plaintiffs' claim in Allen that the government's failure to deny tax exemptions somehow hindered plaintiffs' children's chances to receive integrated education by facilitating development of segregated schools.9 6 Similarly, indigent plaintiffs in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization 91 failed to demonstrate that a revenue ruling granting favorable tax status to hospitals providing limited indigent services actually caused their inability to secure medical care. 98 It also precluded standing for Palestinian plaintiffs in Khalaf who claimed that the tax exemptions they sought to challenge had caused confiscation of their property in the Occupied Territories. 99
The cases denying standing to tax-exemption challenges confirm that a claim of indirect harm requires a solidly defined injury-in-fact and a logically consistent line of causation. Each challenge discussed fell short of one or both of these standards. The courts have never indicated that they would deny standing for a better-stated challenge to a third party's tax exemption; they have granted standing in numerous and varied cases involving challenges to third-party status under other federal regulations.
C. Prudential Limitations on Standing
In addition to the constitutional tests for standing, the Supreme Court has developed a number of "prudential" limitations to ensure judicial self-restraint. The Court has described these limitations as "closely related to Art[icle] III concerns but essentially matters of judicial self-govemance." 100 Unlike the constitutional standing tests, the prudential requirements are subject to elimination for any given class of plaintiffs.101
The most ubiquitous prudential limitation is that a plaintiff claiming a right under a regulation must stand within the "zone of interests" which Congress intended the attendant statute to protect.102 Although the zone of interests test does not demand an actual showing of Congressional purpose, the Court uses the test to decide whether particular plaintiffs are appropriate parties to challenge regulations under the "evident intent [of Congress] to make agency action presumptively reviewable." 103 This requirement occasionally precludes standing for plaintiffs who have shown cognizable injuries-in-fact to challenge statutes or regulations. 104 But in general, the zone of interests test is relatively kind to plaintiffs. 105 The standard shares with the Court's constitutional standing criteria a tendency toward ambiguity . 106
The Court has articulated two other prudential limitations, both of which are subject to exceptions in particular cases. The Court usually denies standing when plaintiffs plead "generalized grievance[s] shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens." 107 The Court also generally refuses to hear claims in which plaintiffs assert the rights of third parties rather than their own rights. Court views both of these limitations, like the zone of interests test, as protecting courts from the need to decide "abstract questions of wide public significance" which other branches of government might more appropriately address.109 Although the prudential limitations may affect standing determinations for challenges to the regulatory status of third parties 110 and claims of competitor standing 111 in general, they should not bar challenges raised against third parties' tax exemptions. The Supreme Court has limited its standing analysis of such challenges to the constitutional requirements even where plaintiffs did not assert underlying constitutional rights. 112 Moreover, little possibility exists that plaintiffs asserting cognizable harms to challenge third-parties' tax exemptions would fall outside the zone of interests of section 50l(c)(3); when Congress passes a statute barring tax-exempt organizations from certain activities, it protects competitors or others who would suffer if those organizations participated in the specified activities. With neither of the other prudential limitations apposite, third-party tax status challenges appear safe from whatever confusion the limitations have fostered.
The Supreme Court's standing doctrine demonstrates that Lenora Fulani has raised a viable challenge to debate sponsors' tax exemptions. The Court has acknowledged that injuries to competitive capacities satisfy its injury-in-fact standard. Once a plaintiff has alleged a significant injury, he must simply show a sufficient causal relationship between his injuries and the challenged conduct to fulfill the traceability and redressability requirements and establish constitutional standing. Numerous plaintiffs challenging regulatory treatment of third parties have shown such causal connections, despite the indirect nature of their injuries. For a challenge like Fulani's, the added standing burdens of the prudential limitations are not a concern. An analysis of tionship between plaintiff and the third party and the ease with which the third party could assert her own rights. See Fletcher, supra note 42, at 246. For criticisms of the third party standing doctrine as a largely artificial division which should give way to a zone of interests approach, see [Vol. 90:838 success in elections may greatly influence progress toward those goals. These insights prompted the court to emphasize both the breadth and the depth of Fulani's alleged injuries.
Fulani's alleged injuries were broad because the challenged conduct harmed important goals other than actually winning the presidency. The court characterized Fulani's lost "opportunity to communicate her political ideas to the electorate on equal terms with other significant presidential candidates" as an injury distinct from her loss of competitive advantage in the election per se. 116 By separating these factors, the court acknowledged that political communication serves a variety of advocacy goals beyond the bottom line of victory.
Chief Judge Mikva, dissenting from the D.C. Circuit's decision in Fulani v. Brady, elaborated on this theme when he noted Fulani's "credibility as a 'spoiler' and public advocate." 117 His dissent also emphasized that Fulani's status as a woman of color would likely have enhanced her importance as a spoiler.11s
Fulani's alleged injuries from defendants' acts were also substantial. She asserted that participation in televised debates provided a critical source of the mass exposure upon which campaigns depend for legitimacy. 119 The Second Circuit stressed "the powerful beneficial effect that mass media exposure can have today on the candidacy of a significant aspirant seeking national political office" and firmly concluded that debate participants improved their competitive positions over nonparticipants. 120 The court's recognition of the depth of Fulani's alleged injuries gains force from its comprehension of their breadth, because Fulani's exclusion from televised debates arguably affected all of her goals as a candidate.
Fulani's alleged injuries in both League and Brady arose under the Internal Revenue Code, 121 but they also embraced underlying consti- conclusory skepticism about the relative importance of debates: the court rejected plaintiff minor-party candidates' appeal of defendant agency's refusal to prohibit televising of a debate from which the debate sponsors had excluded plaintiffs. tutional claims. 122 Fulani argued that her exclusion-from the debates violated her First Amendment right to free expression by denying an opportunity to communicate her political message in the same manner as other legitimate presidential candidates; the Brady dissent found that Fulani's claim "suggests restriction of 'classically political speech' and so goes to the core of the First Amendment." 123 She also alleged that the exclusion violated her equal protection rights because of her race and gender. 124 The D.C. Circuit's analysis of Fulani's alleged injuries was virtually nonexistent. Contrary to traditional standing analysis, the court did not move methodically through the three prongs of the constitutional test and did not attempt to examine Fulani's alleged injuries through the prism of the challenged conduct. Prior to its discussion of the causation prongs, the court instead raised miscellaneous objections to standing 126 and broadly criticized the application of competitor standing to the facts of Fulani's case. 127 The court's vague treatment of the injury prong simplified its characterization of Fulani's injuries as not traceable to the challenged conduct or redressable by the requested relief. 128 The court avoided an open attack on Fulani's chosen injury, perhaps aware of the district court's and the Second Circuit concurrence's problematic attempts to characterize Fulani's injury narrowly. The Second Circuit concurrence purported to accept arguendo that Fulani had suffered a judicially cognizable injury 129 but characterized Fulani's injury at a critical point in its traceability analysis as the voters' "rejection of her candidacy." 130 By limiting Fulani's injury to her actual inability to gamer votes, the court completely discounted her independent interest in circulating her views and thus unfairly diminished the connection between her injuries and the challenged tax exemption.
The district court in Brady showed even less regard for Fulani's alleged injuries. The court first attempted to conflate Fulani's loss of political legitimacy from nonparticipation in the debates with her supposed frustration at the advancement of an adverse political agenda. 131 The latter injury would probably not have supported standing, 132 but 126. See Brady, 935 F.2d at 1326-27. The court's strategies included an invocation of Justice Stewart's concurrence in Simon, 426 U.S. at 46, and its attempt to create a statutory bar to standing. See infra section 11.C.
127. See Brady, 935 F.2d at 1327-28. Without providing any clear-cut analysis, the court suggested that competitor standing did not apply to third-party challenges to regulatory action.
The court, again without firm analysis, argued that a plaintiff might only challenge the government's preferential tax treatment of a third party based upon the plaintiff's own unlawfully burdensome tax liability. It implied that the existence of case law supporting such direct tax challenges precluded Fulani's theory in the wholly distinct area of indirect injury from a third party's tax exemption. 133 This sweeping dismissal shortchanged Fulani's injuries so dramatically that the court could deny traceability and redressability with deceptive ease. Indeed, the court admitted that its injury analysis laid the groundwork for its causation discussion, 134 and it actually spent the latter half of its purported injury analysis attacking Fulani's causation theories. 1 3 5
The implausibility of these prior attempts to understate Fulani's alleged injuries clearly weakened the credibility of the Second Circuit concurrence's and the district court's attendant traceability and redressability analyses. The D.C. Circuit cleverly dodged the same trap, but its almost total failure to analyze Fulani's injury betrayed its strategy. If the court had recognized the breadth and depth of the injuries alleged, as had the Second Circuit, the plausibility of denying those injuries' traceability to the challenged conduct and their redressability through the requested relief would have severely diminished.
The Second Circuit Analysis
The Second Circuit concluded that it could fairly trace Fulani's injuries to the League's tax exemption. The court explicitly rejected the notion that Fulani's injuries "derive [d] solely from the fact that she ultimately failed to win the presidency in 1988," emphasizing defendants' "allegedly partisan restriction of her opportunities to communicate her political ideas to the voting public at large." 136 The court traced this broad injury to Fulani's exclusion from the debates. Because of the regulatory requirement that debate sponsors be tax exempt, 137 the tax exemption that the government granted to the League caused the exclusion.
found that plaintiffs' claims rested on objections to racial stigmatization but challenged conduct had not harmed plaintiffs themselves).
133. Brady, 129 F. Supp. at 162. The court proceeded to downplay Fulani's claim because, in its estimation, the major-party candidates prior to the debates already had the "realistic chance of winning the election and ..• competitive advantage" which Fulani sought. 729 F. Supp. at 162. Aside from this argument's circularity -denial of previous media exposure could not injure Fulani's political legitimacy because her 1ack of media exposure had prevented her from gaining political legitimacy -it presumes the vecy sort of analytic insight into the nature of political legitimacy which the court had just abjured.
134. In discussing traceability, the court compared Fulani's claims to the situation in Common Cause v. Bolger. 138 In that case, candidates and prospective candidates for Congress challenged portions of the Congressional franking statute which subsidized incumbents' political mailings. They claimed injuries to their ability to compete politically, alleging that the statute illegally aided reelection of incumbents. 139 The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of standing, ruling inter alia that plaintiffs' alleged injuries were directly traceable to the statute's operation. 140 The Second Circuit found Bolger strikingly similar to the circumstances in League. The court stressed the earlier decision's expansive view of candidates' interests arising out of elections. 141 Bolger also paralleled the degree of attenuation between Fulani's injuries and the conduct she challenged; the court rejected defendants' invocations of cases involving more attenuated injuries. 142 Like Fulani, the plaintiffs in Bolger had actually competed, or clearly intended to compete imminently, in the election which gave rise to their challenge and had explained the particular mechanism by which the challenged government action had injured their ability to compete. 143 The Second Circuit found no impediment to traceability in the high Court's admonition that an injury does not fail the traceability test merely because it is indirect. 144 The court correctly concluded that the decisions in Allen and Simon had not precluded finding traceability for a third-party tax-status challenge. Those cases had merely confirmed the requirement of a "nexus" between the challenged conduct and the alleged injury; the court found that the FEC regulation mandating tax-exempt debate sponsors created just such a nexus in League. 145 The Brady dissent extended this analysis, distinguishing both Allen and Simon. Allen, the dissent said, had involved unpredictable decisions of multiple third parties with critical impacts on plaintiffs' alleged injuries. In Simon, the plaintiffs' injuries might arguably have arisen without the challenged revenue ruling. 146 The tax exemption which Fulani challenged, in contrast, directly caused the injuries arising out of her exclusion from the debates. 14 The Second Circuit used a similar analysis to conclude that the requested relief could adequately redress Fulani's injuries. Because revocation of the League's tax exemption would prevent the League's sponsorship of the debates, revocation would also prevent Fulani's injuries.148 The court rejected the proposition that it had to repair all inequities in competition among the candidates in order successfully to redress Fulani's injuries: "a substantial likelihood that the relief requested will have a substantial ameliorative effect on the specific injury alleged" would suffice. 149 The D.C. Circuit dissent in Brady bolsters the Second Circuit's persuasive redressability arguments. Responding to the majority's speculation about the behavior of particular "intervening actors," 150 the dissent concluded that redress of Fulani's injuries did not require the court to guarantee Fulani some set quantity of media exposure but simply to prevent "the prejudice to her candidacy that would inevitably result from a one-on-one debate between [the] rival candidates."1 51
The two causation prongs, traceability and redressability, might seem to pose the greatest challenge to standing, simply because they require arguments about degrees of causal attenuation that cannot produce absolute answers. This difficulty appears especially acute in the redressability inquiry, which seeks to determine the concreteness of the requested relief. But the traceability and redressability inquiries necessarily merge in cases such as these, where plaintiffs allege future injuries from challenged agency actions 152 and request mere cessation of illegal conduct. 153 Fulani's injuries satisfy both requirements.
The D. C. Circuit Analysis
The D.C. Circuit held that Fulani's injuries failed the traceability and redressability tests. The court's central theory was that, in a third-party tax-status challenge, "the exemption likely will not bear sufficient links of traceability and redressability to the alleged injury to warrant standing under Allen .•.. " 154 Having thus revealed the unof her debate exclusion, for which the League's tax-exempt status was a necessary condition. Her case therefore diverged starkly from Simon, in which plaintiffs had claimed injuries from hospitals' policies which they had not shown necessarily to have arisen out of the challenged government conduct. See certain foundation of its argument, the court struggled to demonstrate that its narrow conception of Fulani's injuries bore an insufficient relationship to the CPD's tax exemption to support standing. The court denied traceability and redressability because of the critical role played by intervening actors in the chain of causation. The court first examined the FEC regulation requiring tax exemption for debate sponsorship. While conceding that "CPD's tax exemption is a cause-in-fact of [Fulani's] injury," 155 the court characterized the regulation as an intervening cause because it created the essential relationship between the tax status and the injury. 156 The court proposed that Fulani should have sought relief based upon the regulation itself, citing an attendant FEC regulation providing administrative review for "violation[s] of any statute or regulation over which the Commission has jurisdiction." 157 But Fulani had no cause to complain of any violation of section 110.13(a), because that regulation merely applied mechanically to her circumstances. Only the grant of tax exemption arguably involved an unlawful abuse of discretion, making that action the proper target for Fulani's challenge. Moreover, the D.C. Circuit suggested no administrative adjudication that could have encompassed Fulani's constitutional complaints.
Two other flaws mar the court's argument that the FEC regulation intervened between the debate sponsor's tax exemption and Fulani's alleged injuries. First, the regulation did not "intervene" in the fact pattern which culminated in Fulani's alleged injuries; rather, it existed as a concurrent condition for televised debates to take place. Second, to characterize federal regulations generally as "intervening causes" of injuries that actually result from actions they authorize would involve unreasonable speculation. The dissent attacked the court's argument on this basis, pointing out the absurd result that "the majority's approach would preclude any suit to force compliance with a statute or administrative regulation."15s
The court next suggested that the debate sponsors and the majorparty candidates intervened in the causal chain linking the grant of tax exemption to Fulani's injuries. It speculated that the CPD might decline to sponsor televised presidential debates if the government tried 155. 935 F.2d at 1329. This significant concession undermines the court's conclusion. The Supreme Court has never gone so far as to suggest that an injury cannot be fairly traced to its cause·in-fact. Indeed, the Court has recognized that a showing of "but for'' causation satisfies the traceability requirement. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74-75 (1978) .
156. 935 F.2d at 1329. 157. 11C.F.R. §111.4(a) (1990). 158. 935 F.2d at 1335 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting). The Supreme Court had previously rejected the argument that speculation about the hypothetical absence of a government enactment could defeat traceability. See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 77-78 (holding that plaintiff did not have to answer defendant's speculation that plaintiff's injury might have happened even absent a challenged statute).
to affect its behavior by revoking its tax exemption, or that if the CPD altered its standards to include minor-party candidates, the majorparty candidates might refuse to participate. 159 The court concluded that these possibilities defeated redressability because either would have prevented Fulani from improving her competitive position. 160 But this conclusion depends on the court's artificially restrictive conception of Fulani's injuries. Fully understood, her injuries included diminution of her roles as advocate and spoiler; even the results that the court hypothesized would have helped her in those capacities. 161 In general, the court ignored the settled principle that indirectness of an injury does not necessarily preclude traceability and redressability.162 None of the court's proposed "intervening causal actors" altered the fact that Fulani's alleged injuries could not have occurred without the government's grant of tax exemption to the CPD and that her position as a candidate would have improved were the exemption revoked. 163 The court might conceivably have contended that the degree of intervening causation rendered Fulani's causal chain too attenuated to support a finding of traceability, but its categorical argument that intervening actors necessarily broke the chain lacked merit.
Precedent helped neither the D.C. 161. The court's arguments about the debate sponsors and major-party candidates suffer not only from deficient accounting of Fulani's injuries, but also from failure to acknowledge the critical role which debates play in creating the gap between major-party and minor-party candidates. Fulani would have certainly preferred no debates to the status quo, because debates confer legitimacy and provide exposure which are currently restricted to the major parties. See infra section III.C.2.
162. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 163. The Brady dissent stated that the court's categorical argument against causation based on the existence of intervening actors "is not, and has never been, the law." 935 F.2d at 1333 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that the intervening forces discussed by the majority did not so attenuate Fulani's chain of causation as to preclude redress of her alleged injuries. 935 F.2d at 1334-35 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting). the sponsoring organization's need for tax exemption. Neither of the League concurrence's arguments thus overcomes Fulani's showings of traceability and redressability. The D.C. Circuit's failure to present any principle or precedent opposed to finding causation in Brady confirms the Second Circuit's conclusions that Fulani could fairly trace her injuries to the debate sponsoring organization's tax exemption and that the court could redress those injuries by revoking the exemption. The D.C. Circuit could not draw Fulani's injuries narrowly enough to obscure their source in the challenged conduct; its attempt to drown out causation in a cacophony of "intervening actors" also failed. Fulani satisfied all three prongs of the constitutional test for standing in both League and Brady.
C. Prudential Limitations
None of the Fulani decisions explicitly discussed possible prudential barriers to standing. Neither the majority nor the concurrence in the Second Circuit even hinted that a candidate's challenge to a debate sponsor's tax exemption might involve a generalized grievance, pleading of a third party's rights, or a zone of interests problem. But the D.C. Circuit implied that Fulani's injuries might fall outside the zone of interests of section 50l(c)(3). 175 The court suggested that a provision of the Internal Revenue Code providing a remedy for entities aggrieved by section 50l(c)(3) determinations 176 constitutes "apparent congressional intent" to forbid third-party challenges to tax exemptions. 177 The suggestion lacks merit. The court hedged its claim, first calling the provision "inconsistent with, if not preclusive of, third party litigation of tax-exempt status" 178 but conceding that "the cited statute does not preclude expressly the possibility that a third party could (1) Petitioner. A pleading may be filed under this section only by the organization the qualification or classification of which is at issue.
[Vol. 90:838 file an action under some [other] statute or source of law .... " 179 In fact, the cited statute had nothing to do with third-party tax status challenges. The court triumphantly noted that the provision limits its remedy to would-be 50l(c)(3) recipients. "[I]t certainly is telling," the court concluded, "that Congress thought it necessary to create a specific remedy for the adjudication of a [section] 50l(c)(3) determination even on behalf of the one entity whose standing is least subject to challenge, and that Congress chose to limit the remedy to that entity." 180 But a simpler interpretation would conclude that Congress was simply not contemplating third-party challengers when it provided a remedy for applicants to challenge their own status. The court fallaciously conflated two qualitatively distinct types of challenges.181
Moreover, the court's statutory digression ignored the irrelevance of the zone of interests requirement to third-party tax-status challenges.182 The dissent pointed out this error, stressing that the zone of interests test has no role in determining standing to raise constitutional claims. 183 The major cases denying standing for third-party taxstatus challenges have never invoked the zone of interests requirement. 184
Only the broad caution about intruding upon functions of the other branches of government might appear relevant to Fulani's claims. 185 Although the D.C. Circuit did not raise this objection to standing, the Second Circuit concurrence argued that granting Fulani standing would compel the court "to tell the executive branch whom it should prosecute for tax violations; in essence, advise it how it should implement the laws." 186 Besides wrongly implying that redressing Fulani's claims would have involved a prosecution, the concurrence's objection miscalculated the impact of granting her standing on separation of powers grounds. Fulani's third-party strategy avoided the sort of direct challenge to Presidential authority which rightly con-179. 935 F.2d at 1327. The court slid even further off its position by explicitly admitting that it might grant standing for this type of action: "[I]f we were to find that a case does exist in which one party can litigate properly the tax exemption of another, it would have to be some· thing far removed from the norm." 935 F.2d at 1327. The court failed to define "the norm" or explain how an acceptable case would have to deviate from it.
180. 935 F.2d at 1327. 181. The language of § 7428 itself supports this distinction. The statute provides only for declaratory relief, not for the injunctive relief which was central to redress of Fulani's alleged injuries. 26 U.S.C. § 7428(a) (1988 The Second Circuit properly granted Lenora Fulani standing to challenge the tax exemption of the organization which excluded her from its televised presidential debates. Analysis of the Supreme Court's constitutional and prudential standing tests as the Second and D.C. Circuits applied them to Fulani's claims permits no other conclusion. In order to deny standing to a plaintiff like Fulani, a court must make at least one of three critical errors: underestimation of plaintiff's injuries; overemphasis of the importance of intervening parties; or errant application of prudential limitations. The D.C. Circuit made all three errors and reached the wrong result.
Strictly legal analysis is not the only path to the conclusion that minor-party candidates should have standing to challenge debate sponsors' tax exemptions. Political scientists' theories and observations about elections provide an alternative basis for standing which none of the Fulani decisions explore. Part III of this Note undertakes such an exploration.
III. POLITICAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES
This Part argues that political scientists' findings about minorparty candidates' roles in the American electoral system bolster the Second Circuit's justifications for its decision to find standing, particularly on the causation prongs, and help to justify candidate standing to challenge debate sponsors' tax status in their own right. Section III.A suggests that the Supreme Court's current standing jurisprudence leaves standing analysis open to considerations of normative policy. Section III.B advances the widely accepted theory that the basic structure of American elections cripples minor-party candidacies and argues that this reality compels recourse to the courts for minor-party candidates. Section III.C contends that the mass media's importance to successful political campaigns makes inclusion in televised debates a logical target for minor parties' court challenges. Section III.D contends that even unsuccessful minor-party candidacies offer society significant benefits and concludes that public-benefit theories of standing may justify standing to vindicate minor-party candidates' interests. [Vol. 90:838 These arguments support Part II's conclusion that courts should hear minor-party candidates' challenges to debate sponsors' tax status.
A. Lack of Clarity and Principle in the Supreme Court's Current Standing Doctrine
Uncertain sources and inconsistent results mark the jurisprudence of standing. Lower courts and commentators regularly complain that the Court's standing doctrines offer "less than pellucid" 189 guidance. From the uncertain demands of traceability and redressability to the slippery distinction between individualized injuries-in-fact on one hand and generalized grievances on the other, the Court's standing tests leave a wide range of fact situations open to contrary results.
Scholars have repeatedly suggested that the Supreme Court uses its muddy jurisprudence of standing to mold results with an eye to the merits of particular claims. 190 A core axiom of standing analysis is that courts must determine standing apart from the merits. 191 But the suspicion that the Supreme Court considers the merits in its standing decisions has become so ubiquitous that one commentator has explicitly urged the Court to reconceive standing as a question on the merits.192
The Court's clearest injection of an extraneous consideration into its purportedly principled standing analysis has been its elevation of "separation of powers principles" 193 to the pinnacle of standing jurisprudence. Separation of powers concerns arguably have an appropriate function in standing determinations as the source of the prudential limitations. 194 But in Allen v. Wright, 195 the Court invoked separation of powers to support its pivotal finding that the injuries which parents of students of color alleged were not traceable to the government's failure to deny tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools. 196 After purporting to explain the absence of traceability with conventional causation analysis, 1 97 the Court turned to federalism analysis, upon which it also claimed to base its traceability decision. 198 Justice Stevens, dissenting in Allen, sharply criticized the majority's separation of powers alchemy, noting that the Court had provided no basis for lower courts to apply its new reasoning 1 99 and hinting that the Court had developed a back door approach to the merits. 200 Commentators have made the latter charge explicit, attacking the separation of powers approach to causation as unprincipled. 201 Commentators have also pointed out the fundamental irrelevance of separation of powers concerns to traceability and to the mechanics of constitutional standing as a whole. 202 Finally, they have criticized the Court's invocation of federalism on its own terms, arguing that federal courts should take responsibility for giving citizens opportunities to 198. The Court said, in part: The idea of separation of powers that underlies standing doctrine explains why our cases preclude the conclusion that respondents' alleged injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action" of the IRS. That conclusion would pave the way generally for suits challenging, not specifically identifiable Government violations of law, but the particular programs agencies establish to carry out their legal obligations. 468 U.S. at 759 (citation omitted). This explanation carries echoes of both the prudential bar against standing to air generalized grievances and of sovereign immunity principles. Its relationship to the problem of causation is less obvious.
199. 468 U.S. at 792 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 200. 468 U.S. at 790-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court's approach involves "the justiciability of the issues that respondents seek to raise").
201. See, e.g., Nichol, Abusing Standing, supra note 40, at 641, 657-58. 202. See id. at 645-49 (argning vigorously that "standing is not a separation of powers doctrine"); Sunstein, supra note 75, at 1469 (Court's views on separation of powers "are quite distinct from notions of causation"); cf. Floyd, supra note 42, at 891 (advocating separation of powers as central factor in standing analysis based on zone of interests approach). While Professor Floyd approves of a focus on separation of powers in standing, the fact that he does so in the context of advocating a zone of interests approach validates the other commentators' objections. Separation of powers has always played a key role in the prudential standing limitations on which Floyd, unlike Professors Nichol and Sunstein, would refocus standing analysis. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975) . Floyd makes no case for concentrating the constitutional analysis which the Court currently purports to follow on separation of powers concerns.
[Vol. 90:838 challenge allegedly illegal agency acts. 203 The question whether a minor-party presidential candidate can challenge a debate sponsor's tax exemption, like any question of standing, requires analysis under the Supreme Court's doctrines. But the Court has rendered those doctrines ultimately doubtful enough to open standing questions to more broad-based inquiry. Indeed, the Court's imposition of separation of powers concerns invites an examination of the public interests involved in standing questions, assuming that standing gives plaintiffs an opportunity to prevail on the merits. Such an examination benefits standing analyses by offering an alternative to the Court's policy priorities and by countering the Court's disregard for the serious public concerns inherent in standing battles.
B. Systematic Barriers to Minor-Party Candidacies
The two-party system has become a reality of U.S. presidential politics. 204 This situation has not developed through the unchecked flow of natural political passions. Rather, the political system of the United States has instituted a battery of legal and structural barriers to significant minor-party participation in presidential elections.
The system the United States uses to choose the President and members of Congress, which political scientists call "plurality voting,"205 provides the most pervasive impediment to minor-party candidacies in national elections. 206 U.S. elections reward candidates who receive the most votes in each individual contest, unlike Europeanstyle parliamentary systems, which apportion seats among all parties surpassing a certain threshold. According to political thinker Maurice Duverger, plurality voting tends to create and maintain two-party systems. 207 The mechanism is simple: candidates enter elections to win, the Constitution defines winning as securing a plurality of votes on a single ballot, and the resultant need to maximize votes fosters a system 206. This Note often refers to "national elections," which include congressional as well as presidential elections. For purposes of this discussion, the differences between the two types of elections are often minimal: each depends upon a constituency's popular votes, federal election laws and norms govern both, and the major parties have generally dominated both. Where differences become important, as for example in considering state ballot access problems for presidential candidates, this Note will specify the election to which it refers.
207. with the minimum number of competitors. 208 This process discourages minor-party candidacies by encouraging candidates to build coalitions. before elections; the electorate's multiplicity of view.s thus collapses around two poles, each rather close the center, instead of finding expression in a multiplicity of parties and candidates. 20 9 Several factors exacerbate this process in contemporary presidential elections. First, the expense and complexity of building a nationwide plurality prevents minor parties from competing fully with the better-endowed major parties. 210 Second, the electoral college system211 minimizes third parties' chances by ignoring their showings in states where they do not win pluralities, thereby hampering minor parties' influence as nationwide "spoilers." 212 Most importantly, primary elections and other intraparty nominating contests preempt minor parties by enveloping multifarious ideological conflicts in intraparty frameworks and dispensing with those conflicts before the general election. 213 Primaries also give the major parties control over access to the political stage because the major parties, through state governments, set the rules governing eligibility for primaries. 214 Primaries and other intraparty nominating contests, although extraconstitutional components of national elections, have become as much fixtures of those elections as the electoral college.
The federal and some state governments have created other provisions outside the Constitution's basic dictates to prevent or discourage minor-party participation in presidential elections. The Federal Elec-208. See Riker, supra note 205, at 21. Riker slightly amends Duverger's law by including exceptions for countries in which national third parties retain continuous influence as local second parties and where one party among several is a consistent plurality winner. Id. at 32. Neither of these exceptions affects the law's application to the United States.
209. See id. at 21. Riker contrasts this pattern with events occurring under electoral systems which allocate representation proportionally and those which require a runoff vote in the absence ofa simple majority. Because neither of these systems requires candidates to maximize votes at the initial stage, neither fosters a two-party system. Id. European parliamentary nations provide evidence of the difference in proportional systems. Runoff systems persist in some American states' election systems.
210. See SMALLWOOD, supra note 1, at 11. Smallwood argues that this difficulty has accounted for the regional limitations of most of the important minor-party movements in U.S. history.
211 [Vol. 90:838 tion Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 215 discriminate against minor-party candidates by providing the major-party presidential candidates with tens of millions of dollars in preelection subsidies and opening large areas of election conduct to unlimited spending by state and local major-party committees; minor parties can receive public funds only after passing certain performance thresholds in national elections. 216 This discriminatory public financing framework exacerbates minor parties' inherent fundraising disadvantage. 217 Even more invidious have been some states' discriminatory restrictions on ballot access for minor parties. Major parties in many states have manipulated state laws to require early filing deadlines, demand prohibitive numbers of petition signatures in order for minor-party candidates to appear on state ballots, or restrict general election access for candidates who lost primaries. 218 The Supreme Court has intervened in this arena, striking down a state's early filing deadline for independent presidential candidates on equal protection grounds. 219 Beyond their direct deleterious effects on minor-party candidacies, these structural barriers discourage voters from supporting minorparty candidates. Put succinctly, "Third party candidates also do poorly because most people think they will do poorly. The prophecy that a candidate cannot win is self-fulfilling .... " 220 Political scientists have dubbed constituent behavior in a regime hostile to minor parties "sophisticated voting." 221 According to this straightforward theory, "the voter takes account of anticipated votes by others and then votes so as to bring about the best realizable outcome for himself .... " 222 Thus voters who actually prefer a minor-party candidate may nonetheless choose the less offensive major-party candidate out of fear that their votes would be wasted on their first choice. 22 structural obstacle may hinder minor-party female candidates and candidates of color, members of groups often marginalized out of the major parties, who must overcome significant popular prejudices as well as "sophisticated" biases against minor parties.224
These structural provisions present a formidable barrier to minorparty presidential candidacies. Together they comprise an electoral obstacle course. This situation generates arguments both for and against standing for minor-party candidates to challenge debate sponsors' tax exemptions. If exclusion of minor-party candidates was a critical and deliberate motivation behind the constitutional barriers, then such parties are justly doomed to failure. Subsequent structural barriers to minor-party candidacies, the argument goes, are as legitimate as they are formidable and therefore weigh strongly against a judicial forum for a deservedly futile insurgency against the system. If, on the other hand, barriers to minor-party candidates are an unintended and undesirable side effect of the Constitution's electoral framework, then those barriers should not discourage adjudication of minor-party candidates' rights. To the contrary, courts should maximize those rights within proper constitutional boundaries; challenges to the tax exemptions of debate sponsors may provide them an excellent vehicle.
The guiding precepts of American democracy do not foreclose minor-party success. The Constitution did not establish a two-party system; the political system realigned repeatedly during the years following independence. Structural barriers to minor parties have changed over time; the lower they are, the likelier are minor-party candidates to succeed. 225 Political scientists have suggested that partisan realignments, in the natural course of American political events, might lead to greater success for minor parties. 226 Within constitutional limits, we should let nature take its course. Structural barriers to minor-party electoral participation should encourage judicial attention to minor parties' grievances. [Vol. 90:838 In contemporary elections for national office, candidates cannot communicate directly with all voters about all of the concerns which animate campaigns. The issues have become too complex and varied, the electorate too divided. In this climate, "[m]ass communication has become the center stage for all major political events." 227 The mass media, most importantly television, 228 have come to dominate many critical processes in elections, including setting agendas, legitimating candidates, and determining candidates' public images.
Over the past three decades political theorists have argued convincingly that the media play an increasingly critical if often unfocused role in determining which issues achieve prominence in campaigns. 229 News outlets' decisions about which issues to stress dictate voters' priorities in analyzing candidates; in one political scientist's words, the media "is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about."230
This role has gained force as television has become the major source of the information which voters consider. 231 Although television has generally aided major-party candidates, its agenda-setting function holds great potential for minor-party candidates. First, minor-party candidates often run primarily to place unpopular views on the public policy map. Second, ideology and personality, the candidate characteristics which television communicates most successfully, 227 . TRENT & FRIEDENBERG, supra note 224, at 124; see also F. CHRISTOPHER ARTERTON, MEDIA PoLmcs 1 (1984) (stating thl\t "[n]ewspapers, radio, newsweeklies, and television have become the major sources of information about election campaigns for most U.S. citizens").
228. See generally ARTERTON, supra note 227, at 1; KRAUS, supra note 5, at 7-27. Professor Kraus stresses that "the relationship between television and the voter" has elevated television to its pinnacle of electoral influence. Even more potentially valuable to minor-party candidates is the mass media's prominent role in familiarizing candidates to the voters. 234 Although this process continues throughout an election, the media exert especially strong influence during the "surfacing period," when some candidates achieve the status of serious contenders by obtaining greater visibility than their opponents. 23 5 Unfortunately for minor-party candidates, however, "there is a huge disparity between the amount of coverage the media give minor parties and the attention they devote to the Democrats and Republicans. " 236 Discussing John Anderson's 1980 independent campaign, probably the most widely covered minor-party presidential candidacy in the past two decades, Professors Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus explain that the media initially praised Anderson's maverick effort but eventually turned against him when they decided that he could not win. 237 The lesson, say the authors, is that "the media can affect voters' perceptions by concentrating on who will win instead of what the candidates are saying. The de facto result benefits the major parties. " 238 This result obviously disadvantages minor-party candidates like Fulani, who may have significant goals short of victory.
The media perform a related important function in giving candidates access to voters and allowing them to shape their images and messages to the circumstances of elections. Use of the mass media has become candidates' most efficient means of communicating with vot- [Vol. 90:838 ers. 239 Television in particular gives candidates and their "handlers" unparalleled control over the selection and presentation of imagery that they want the public to associate with the candidate. 240 Of course, mass media also provide candidates with a rich opportunity to associate negative imagery with their opponents. 241 Political scientists have consistently found the public's perception of a candidate's image to be a more important factor in voting decisions than party identification. 242 In short, " [v] The necessity of mass media exposure to candidates of all parties is clear, and televised debates appear to offer greater political opportunities than any other media events, especially to minor-party candidates. But the political process has failed to administer these critical debates impartially. Remedying these inequities demands a judicial role to address the complaints of minor-party candidates for whom the doors to the debating stage have been bolted from the inside.
D. Standing Based On Public Value of Minor-Party Candidacies
Despite the handicaps they face in the electoral process, minorparty candidacies have yielded numerous benefits to American society. Minor parties have often proposed and popularized new substantive policies which the major parties have lacked the political awareness or foresight to develop. 260 The most telling examples come from the range of populist, socialist, and farmer and labor-oriented parties which flourished during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.261 Among these parties' policy demands which eventually became law were free public education, 262 , supra note 213, at 9. Joslyn examines several models which attempt to explain electoral approaches and finds candidates' appeals during elections generally consistent with "ritualistic," issue-free campaigning and "rhetorical," issue-light campaigning rather than "policy-oriented" campaigning. He concludes that candidates campaign largely on symbols and personalities, diminishing voters' abilities to learn about policy during the election. He does find presidential debates relatively policy-heavy compared to such other media events as spot advertisements. Id. at 28. But others have frequently criticized debates for ultimately elevating appearances over substance. See, e.g., KRAus, supra note 5, at 31; see also NEWMAN & SHETH, supra note 223, at 67 (characterizing studies on the importance of issues in voting behavior as inconclusive while finding "evidence suggesting that the best single predictor of voting behavior is candidate image").
parties play an important role in the American political system whose diminution by systematic barriers courts should properly address. But this social value may also go far in its own right toward justifying standing for candidate plaintiffs like Fulani. Numerous commentators have urged a jurisprudence of standing which in some way recognizes public rights and interests. 283 Professor Burnham has argued that the Supreme Court has inconsistently developed such a jurisprudence, through a common law process of making standing judgments based on public values in the absence of traditionally cognizable injuries.2 84 Burnham bases his positive conclusion in large measure on the Court's approvals of standing in constitutional cases involving the effectiveness of plaintiffs' votes. 285 The Court has never explicitly condoned such an analysis, which would appear to conflict strongly with the current Court's tendency to restrict judicial reach, 286 but the current status of standing doctrine2 87 leaves such a novel analysis doctrinally viable.
If the Court has, as Burnham argues, implicitly adopted public value analysis to allow it to vindicate critical rights where no cognizable injury exists, then it should extend that analysis to minor-party challenges to debate sponsors' tax exemptions. These cases involve crucial rights and interests in the political process, the most vital artery of our democratic system. The judiciary should recognize that every citizen has a strong interest in minor parties' robust performance of their important sociopolitical functions. 288 The greatest difficulty in articulating a public value basis for these challenges, of course, lies in [Vol. 90:838 sorting out the large variety of interests at stake and determining precisely which ones minor-party candidates should properly advance as plaintiffs. But as citizens whom political dissatisfaction has driven into the electoral fray, minor-party candidates are logical vehicles to vindicate many futerests which they both share with and advance for the rest of society.
The work of political scientists reveals several realities about minor-party candidates, media politics and the American political system in general which bear directly on the question whether courts should find standing for such minor-party candidates. The widely held conclusions of scholars that American society has stacked the political deck against minor parties, that televised debates are extremely important sources of electoral exposure, and that minor-party candidates provide society several distinct benefits strongly support standing for such challenges. Whether or not courts heed these particular conclusions, the political science literature on these topics is thorough, relevant, and revealing enough that it should inform future judicial deliberations about standing disputes in similar cases.
IV. BEYOND THE STANDING ISSUE
This Part briefly explores the practical likelihood that standing for minor-party candidates to challenge debate sponsors' tax exemptions will actually lead to more diverse televised debates. It first evaluates the available evidence to determine whether minor-party candidate plaintiffs might actually carry Fulani's approach to victory on the merits and concludes that such success is clearly possible. Minorparty candidate court victories would force the political system to develop nonpartisan methods for deciding which candidates may participate in debates; this Part briefly discusses prospects for new selection methods.
Close analysis of any standing controversy begs the question whether the claim at issue has any chance of success on the merits. The question is certainly fair in the setting of minor-party candidates' challenges to debate sponsors' tax exemptions, because to grant the relief Fulani requested would require potentially serious reforms of the U.S. political system. Indeed, the Second Circuit's rejection of Fulani's claim on the merits 289 would appear to render the standing issue academic. But the Second Circuit opinion left significant hope that future minor-party plaintiffs might prevail on the merits of challenges to debate sponsors' tax status. The court rested its ultimate rejection of Fulani's claim squarely on the fact that the action had arisen out of parties over others would violate its tax-exempt status under section 50l(c)(3). 290 It proceeded to stress the "critical importance" of the fact that "the subject debates were not general election debates. Rather, they were primary season debates .... " 291 Because of what it saw as "the goals underlying the primary phase of the presidential election contest -i.e., to resolve intra-party disputes and select among competing candidates -" 292 the court rejected Fulani's plea for inclusion in the primary season debates.
Although the court's treatment of primary debates may seem mechanically appealing, it loses force when the inquiry widens to whether a tax-exempt organization may help a political party resolve its internal disputes, particularly where the organization's activity yields side benefits for the party, and truly remain "nonpartisan." But whatever the outcome of that argument, the court's approach strongly suggests that it would rule differently in a general election setting than it did in League. The court did not directly state that it would have granted Fulani relief on a similar claim in a general election setting; but at no point did it even hint at any basis for denying relief other than the case's primary election context. The only firm conclusion which the opinion permits is that the court wholly reserved judgment on the merits of Fulani's claim as it might arise in a general election setting. Given the court's sympathy to Fulani's general arguments, as reflected in its disposition of the standing issue, prospective minorparty tax-status challengers must view the Second Circuit's deferral of Fulani's underlying claims as encouraging precedent.
Victory on the merits for a minor-party candidate plaintiff would require new, truly nonpartisan standards for including candidates in debates that would avoid practically untenable mobs of debaters. 293 Development of such standards, although bound to stir controversy, would be very feasible. [Vol. 90:838 ments to their campaigns 296 while avoiding the circular attempts to determine "significance" which have undermined previous standards for inclusion. 297 A third component, evaluation of each candidate's value to the national political conversation, might also deserve consideration, although its subjectivity would obviously make it difficult to develop and administer. A new regime might also create incentives to debate, preventing major-party candidates from ducking voters' scrutiny. 298 A fair solution to minor-party candidates' exclusion from presidential debates would wipe an ugly blot off the nation's democratic political process. 299 Federal courts, as the only governmental institutions which stand almost completely outside that process and the two-party oligarchy which controls it, must take the lead in confronting the problem. 300 Allowing minor-party candidates to litigate their complaints, in contrast to seeking reforms through the political process, will offer the optimal combination of potentially far-reaching relief and measured, serious contemplation of the issues at stake.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's standing doctrine, while hardly crystalline, supports granting minor-party candidates standing to challenge the tax exemption of a sponsor who excludes them from televised presidential debates. The plaintiff's injuries, in such a case, are easily cognizable as injuries-in-fact under a competitor standing theory. The source of those injuries, the government's grant of tax exemption to the televised debate sponsor, stands well within the limits of causal certainty which the Court's traceability and redressability tests require, as the Court has demonstrated in several decisions finding standing for similar challenges to the regulatory status of third parties.
The Second and D.C. Circuits' competing applications of these rough principles to the problem demonstrate that granting standing in 300. See generally Sunstein, supra note 75, at 1444 (noting, in regulatory context, that rigid standing prohibitions permit those with greater political and economic power to influence policies through the political process, while less-advantaged interests effectively lack an avenue to respond). this instance better satisfies the Supreme Court's precepts and the principles underlying standing. The Second Circuit's recognition of the breadth and depth of the injuries which exclusion from televised debates caused Fulani create a compelling foundation for standing. Such a thorough appraisal of Fulani's injuries undermines the causation arguments which the D.C. Circuit raises against standing: Fulani's broad-based and severe loss of competitive advantage is clearly traceable to an act which hands a crucial forum to her competitors, and a court could redress that loss by forbidding the act. In such a case, "prudential" limitations on standing are inapposite.
The conclusions of political scientists that American political institutions discriminate against minor parties lend the arguments for standing both empirical support and social urgency. Unjust and unnecessary political discrimination against minor-party candidates creates a breach into which the independent judiciary is ideally suited to step. Televised debates, perhaps the foremost among all of the crucial means of media exposure which increasingly decide American elections, are an ideal starting point for minor-party candidates to assert their legal rights. The numerous ways in which minor parties nourish our political culture strongly enhance the case for standing and may justify standing in their own right to vindicate the public benefits of minor-party candidacies.
